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Modern central banks have adopted a ‘risk management’ approach in assessing and presenting risks to macroeconomic 
stability. This paper seeks to contribute to the improvement of central banks’ current strategies for Central and Eastern 
European countries, first by assessing the potential size of macroeconomic risks, and secondly by empirically relating these 
risks to certain selected financial variables. Our results suggest that risks to GDP and the Price Level are significantly 
higher than commonly supposed based on a normal distribution of their cyclical components. However, relating these risks 
to the selected financial variables generated mixed results and is rarely significant in economic terms. We conclude that 
central banks currently risk underestimating the probability of large deviations in GDP and Price Level from their trends. 
A combination of financial variables and the inclusion of international financial variables could result in more significant 
results than the ones used separately in this study, when looking for useful indicators of such events.
JEL: E44, E52, E58.
keywords: central bank policy, financial imbalances, GDP-at-risk, CPI-at-risk.
A modern jegybankok „kockázatkezelési” megközelítést alkalmaznak a makrogazdasági stabilitás kockázatainak értékelé-
sében és bemutatásában. A tanulmány a kelet- és közép-európai jegybankok jelenlegi gyakorlatának tökéletesítését java-
solja először azzal, hogy értékeli a makrogazdasági kockázatok mértékét, majd azzal, hogy ezeket a kockázatokat meg-
kísérli empirikus kapcsolatba hozni néhány pénzügyi mutatóval. Eredményeink szerint a GDP és az árszint kockázatai 
szignifikánsan nagyobbak, mint amekkorát rendszerint sugallnak, amikor normál eloszlás feltételezésével mutatják be ezek 
ciklikus komponenseit. Ugyanakkor a kockázatoknak az általunk választott pénzügyi változókkal való empirikus kapcsola-
tának vizsgálata vegyes eredményt adott, és az eredmények közgazdasági értelemben ritkán szignifikásak. Arra a követ-
keztetésre jutunk, hogy a jegybankok jelenlegi gyakorlatukkal azt kockáztatják, hogy alábecsülik a GDP és az árszínvonal 
saját trendjüktől való nagymértékű eltérésének valószínűségét. Pénzügyi változók kombinációja és nemzetközi pénzügyi 
változók szerepeltetése szignifikánsabb eredményt adhatna, mint a jelen tanulmányban egyenként vizsgált változók, ami-
kor az ilyen eseményeket előrejelző mutatókat keresünk.
Abstract
ÖsszefoglalásMNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 6
Inspiration for this study came from the recent discussions about the appropriate central bank strategies in the era of the 
so-called ‘Great Moderation’, which took place well before the recent financial crisis erupted in 2007. These debates were 
fuelled by a surprising development in the macroeconomy: while central banks were able to achieve price stability by the 
1990s, this was accompanied by elevated asset price volatility and larger financial imbalances. That is to say, it might be 
possible that macroeconomic and financial stability was not guaranteed by focusing exclusively on achieving and 
maintaining price stability.1 Some went even further by saying − in the spirit of Hyman Minsky − that stability itself 
facilitates the build-up of fragilities which lead to future instability.2
The literature on assessing the role of asset prices/financial imbalances (henceforth referred to APFI) has taken multiple 
directions. One strand of the literature analysed monetary policy using an augmented version of the standard policy model 
which allows reaction to APFI directly, over and above their impact on the inflation forecast. The results suggest that − in 
addition to their direct impact on the inflation forecast − it is better to react to APFI using an extended Taylor-rule which 
includes APFI variables.3 Another model-based analysis is provided by Bordo et al. (2002), who conclude that optimal 
monetary policy is conditional on the nature of shocks and the state of the economy, and cannot be summarised in a 
simple reaction function.
Another line of research is based on empirical exercises, instead of policy-oriented models. Borio et al. (2002a, 2002b and 
2009) try to detect ‘unusual’ developments in (several combination of) APFI variables, and relate them to episodes of 
financial instability. What they effectively do is to look at ‘configurations’ of variables which increase the financial 
vulnerability and instability of the economy. Their method is a variant of the early warning indicators. They find that 
unusually strong, sustained growth in combinations of certain variables provides useful early warning signs for policymakers 
in relation to macroeconomic and financial instability. In Borio and Lowe (2004), this method is extended to the information 
content of the same set of explanatory variables on macroeconomic stability, i. e. output and inflation, rather than 
financial stability. The authors look at significant deviations from the output gap (below more than minus one percent gap) 
or a decline in inflation as dependent variables.
A different empirical analysis is given in Cecchetti (2006). His work starts by demonstrating that large Price Level gaps and 
GDP gaps are more likely and larger than usually supposed by using normal distributions. Thus, welfare-improving 
macroeconomic policies should seek to prevent such large deviations. While he looks at ‘very bad’ realisations of these 
macroeconomic variables, Borio and Lowe (2004) look at ‘bad’, but not necessarily ‘very bad’ realisations of the same 
macroeconomic variables. Next, Cecchetti looks for evidence as to whether these ‘very bad’ outcomes can be attributed 
to developments in certain asset prices. He chose housing prices and stock price indices as APFI variables and linked 
‘extreme’ developments in such − i. e. deviations from their own trends by more than a specified threshold − leading to 
‘macroeconomic risks’, with some time lag. While Cecchetti looked at the 17 ‘old’ OECD countries (with long time series 
dating back to the 1970s), Gochoco-Bautista (2008) carried out a similar analysis for eight Asian countries, for similar APFI 
variables, again dating back to the 1970s sometimes, and in other cases just to the 1980s.
1   ‘While large asset price fluctuations are by no means a new phenomenon, a distinctive feature of the last two decades is that prolonged build-ups 
and sharp collapses in asset markets have taken place amidst a decline in consumer price inflation and a more stable macroeconomic environment in 
most of the industrialized world.’ IMF (2000): Chapter III ‘Asset prices and the business cycle’, p. 77.
2 Borio et al. (2009), p. 30.
3 Cecchetti et al. (2000). 
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INTrODUCTION
In this paper, I undertake an analysis similar to that of Cecchetti and Gochoco-Bautista. My aim is to see if APFI variables 
can be used as indicators of macroeconomic risks in Central and Eastern European (henceforth CEE) countries. If it turns 
out that fat tails in the macroeconomic variables are more common than hitherto supposed by central banks, then booms 
and busts are more costly than previously thought and a strategy seeking to pre-emptively cool down the economy even 
if the inflation forecast prepared in line with the present models (i. e. disregarding APFI variables) may be welfare 
improving. In order to implement such a pre-emptive strategy, however, central banks need to have appropriate indicators 
to detect such booms, well in advance before the busts and early enough to be able to react to them.4
In the rest of this paper, I will first look at the macroeconomic risks in CEE countries as proposed by Cecchetti (2006) and 
followed by Gochoco-Bautista (2008). This is followed by the core section of this paper, where I look at certain financial 
variables and their ability to explain or indicate ‘extreme’ developments in the macroeconomic variables. Finally, I present 
the conclusions and discuss in what ways the results could be used by the central bank to improve monetary strategy.
4   The optimal tools are not discussed here as these require a separate study. It is to be noted that this subject is also a hotly debated one; opinions 
spreading from using the traditional policy rate to not using it at all, instead using prudential policies. See Cecchetti (2005) p. 19.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 8
In defining and measuring macroeconomic risks, I have applied Cecchetti’s method5 to data on CEE countries. The basic 
idea is the following: macroeconomic risks are defined as ‘extreme’6 realisations of basic macroeconomic indicators. The 
most common such indicators for central banks are GDP and inflation (or changes in the Price Level). risks to these 
variables were defined as the worst fifth or tenth percentiles of their realisations. As Cecchetti points out, a similar 
concept is used in the financial industry called Value-at-risk (Var). In the financial industry, this concept is used to define 
tolerable risks taken by institutions, branches or individual traders, etc. Essentially, based on the model/historical data 
used by the financial institution, Var defines potential loss over a given horizon.7 With Var, financial institutions do not 
measure the expected size of the likely loss should the negative 5th or 10th percentile outcome materialise. That would 
be measured by the expected tail loss (ETL). By calculating Var, financial institutions determine the likely loss which will 
not be exceeded in 95 or 90 percent of the cases. They are not particularly interested in how much worse the actual 
outcome could be: in the case of a bankruptcy, it is not important how much an institution is bankrupt. By contrast, central 
bankers are not indifferent in terms of the expected tail loss, and thus we will look at ETL as well.
By now, it is widely recognised that financial data do not follow a normal distribution: instead, they are better 
approximated with fat-tailed distributions. Financial market practitioners use extreme value methods to better 
approximate tail risks. One such widely used method is the Hill-index.8 In calculating Hill-index, one does not suppose a 
normal distribution; instead, a fat-tailed distribution such as Student-t is used. The expected tail loss is calculated directly 
from the empirical values of the tail outcomes, instead of the distribution of all the realisations. These are thought to 
approximate the likely risks better than using a normal distribution, which only looks at the expected mean and the 
variance.9
In a macroeconomic context, GDP-at-risk and CPI-at-risk are defined as a certain percentile of the distribution of the 
cyclical component of the GDP and CPI series. The cyclical component, also called the GDP and CPI gap is defined as the 
difference between the seasonally adjusted quarterly realisation of (log) real GDP and (log) Price Level indicator and its 
own trend. This trend is constructed with applying Hodrick-Prescott filter to the seasonally adjusted data. Using this 
series, we can calculate the 5th percentile of the distribution of the cyclical components of both GDP and the CPI price 
level using both normal and Student-t distributions. For the latter, we used the Hill-index as explained above.
We chose eleven CEE countries for which data was available for the relevant time period. These countries share certain 
similarities for the purposes of this analysis: these were transition economies with roughly similar level of economic and 
financial development, which differentiates them from both ‘old’ OECD and Asian countries. None of them are primary 
commodity producers − we excluded russia − and all of them are/were converging to the EU and EMU, both in terms of 
incomes and institutions. We had to define a time period for the analysis, which adequately represents ‘normal’ periods, 
5 Cecchetti (2006) pp. 1-7.
6   The use of quotes are justified by the fact that ‘extreme’ qualifier depends on the supposed/empirical probability. The same realisation could be seen 
as ‘extreme’ if we suppose normal underlying distribution, and less so if it is supposed that it follows a more fat-tailed distribution such as Student-t. 
In this section, our aim is precisely to show that certain negative outcomes are less ‘extreme’ than previously thought, because the often tacit 
supposition of a normal distribution cannot be justified.
7   In finance, it is usually a portfolio that is analysed. Portfolio considerations are not relevant for our macroeconomic risks measures as we look at GDP-
at-risk and CPI-at-risk separately.
8   For internationally coordinated regulatory purposes (i. e. covered by BIS or EU), institutions must calculate Vars using 99 percentile confidence for a 
10-trading day horizon and the resulting potential loss should be covered by 3 times the regulatory capital. This ‘rule of thumb’ multiplication factor 
is intended to cover − among others - the fat tail, as authorities could not find reliable analytical methods to precisely calculate the risks of fat tails. 
That is, instead of using an extreme value method, they multiplied the capital requirement resulted from using non-fat-tailed distribution.
9 A detailed explanation of Hill-index calculation used in this paper can be found in the Appendix.
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i. e. which is not characterised by ‘transformational crisis’. Data availability and the above considerations resulted in time 
series starting variously from 1993−1998 and spanning to 2009 Q1.10 We were interested in improving monetary policy 
strategy in the usual sense, in the sense of seeking to achieve and maintain price stability, and were not directly interested 
in financial stability issues per se.11 The effect of the present global financial crisis is not visible in the dataset used, 
although it captures economic developments up until the moment when the crisis finally hit the CEE countries.
Table 1 shows the results of the macroeconomic risks estimations carried out separately for the individual countries.12 It 
can be seen that for some countries the normal and Student-t distributions suggest reasonably similar risks (GDP-at-risk 
for Poland or CPI-at-risk for Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech r., etc.). However, for most countries the two measures show 
significantly different risks. In case of Hungary for example, the normal distribution suggests that in 5 percent of the cases, 
the GDP-at-risk (or negative deviation from the trend) is about 2.2 percent or worse. However, using the Student-t 
distribution suggests that in 5 percent of all the cases this negative deviation from the trend is more than 8%. The Jarque-
Bera normality test suggests that out of 11 countries, a non-normal distribution is likely in the case of 9 countries for GDP 
and in the case of 7 countries for CPI (and for one more country at a significance level of 10%).13 It is known, however, 
that the Jarque-Bera test has low power in small samples. For this reason, we also made a normality test on the pool of 
the above data.
10 See the Data Appendix for details.
11   We acknowledge that a strict separation of main tasks of monetary policy as seeking macroeconomic stability (price and GDP growth stability) and 
financial stability is impossible in practice and the present crisis is a useful reminder to this fact. See Borio (2006).
12 See appendix for charts on GDP-at-risk and CPI-at-risk for visual representation of the results.
13   Cecchetti found non-normality in 11 of 17 countries for GDP and 10 of 17 countries for CPI in OECD countries. As Levin noted, most of the extreme 
values in Cecchetti’s sample were realisations in the 1970s; newer data exhibited fewer extremes until the recent crisis (Levin, 2006). In our case, 
most of the extreme value of GDP is due to the slowing down of the economies recently. For 8 Asian countries, Gochoco-Bautista found non-normality 
in 7 countries for CPI and in 4 countries for GDP.
Table 1
Macroeconomic risks measures by country, with normal and Student-t distribution and Jarque−Bera normality 
test




of GDP 0.014872 0.023871 0.018065 0.035942 0.013092 0.035552 0.030066 0.013207 0.036931 0.021977 0.017509




Normal −0.02446 −0.03927 −0.02972 −0.05912 −0.02154 −0.05848 −0.04946 −0.02173 −0.06075 −0.03615 −0.0288




Normal −0.03665 −0.01545 −0.02214 −0.07331 −0.03224 −0.06545 −0.14359 −0.04382 −0.2234 −0.03179 −0.0321





for GDP 0 0.000364 0.581005 0 0 0 0 0.552775 0 0.000001 0.00000
 *, ** significant at 
10% or 5% level
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
for CPI 0.208304 0.057449 0.000129 0 0.30004 0.000007 0.00000 0 0.00000 0.27847 0.01366
 *, ** significant at 
10% or 5% level
  * ** **   ** ** ** **   **MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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Table 2 shows the distributional properties of the pooled series. According to the pooled normality test, normality can be 
rejected at any meaningful significance level as p-values are extremely low for both GDP and CPI, although some caveats 
still apply. Using estimation results in future monetary strategy based on past data is appropriate only to the extent that 
we are confident that i) past realisations are sufficiently good predictors of future realisations, and ii) both the future and 
the past of the country sample is sufficiently homogeneous. This result is based on past observable data, which involves 
the effects of past policy reactions as well.
In summarising the results of this section, we can say that it is likely that GDP and CPI-at-risk are significantly different 
from a normal distribution. As it is currently customary to present macroeconomic risks with fan charts or quadratic loss 
functions imposing normal distributions, our results warn us that most likely we underestimate the likelihood and/or size 
of bad macroeconomic outcomes and we habitually present overly optimistic risk scenarios.14 This part of our work 
complements similar results obtained for the ‘old’ OECD and Asian countries by Cecchetti and Gochoco-Bautista, and could 
be used in presenting more accurate risk scenarios to the monetary policy committees and the public in general. It is to 
be noted that the result of this section can be used independently of the rest of the paper as well; that is, independently 
from whether these bad outcomes are caused by APFI variables to be analysed in the next section or not. In the next 
section, we look at the latter issue.
14   The Bank of England was the leading bank to publish uncertainty around its baseline projection using fan charts. See Bank of England (internet): The 
Inflation projection: understanding the fan chart, p. 31 section Choice of distribution for details. As BoE illustrates uncertainty by constructing skewed 
distribution using ‘two half’ normal distributions (‘two piece normal’ method), it still underestimates fat tails. Moreover, the Bank of England 
represents the central projection by the mode, instead of the mean. A side effect of this is to give even less weight to tail risks. A similar ‘two-part 
method’ was used by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank until recently. At the end of 2010 the MNB changed to symmetric fan charts (see MNB 2004). The 
Czech National Bank (2008) and, by now, riksbank also use symmetrical normal distribution. It is to be noted that not all inflation targeting central 
banks make and publish quantitative estimations about risks around the central projections.
Table 2












Sum Sq. Dev. 0,289982 1,112211
Observations 621 621
Cross sections 11 11MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 11
In the previous section, we concluded that fat-tailed distributions are likely for CPI and GDP gaps, but we did not say 
anything about their possible causes. In this section, we look at the possible links between asset price/financial imbalance 
indicators and ‘extreme’ GDP or CPI developments. The underlying idea is that APFI developments can result in 
unsustainable processes, whereby financial fragility builds up, while this may not captured in the inflation forecasts. As 
the unsustainable process comes to an end, the process reverses itself resulting in a costly boom-bust or overheating-
overcooling cycle. Central banks may seek to dampen such inefficient fluctuations caused by APFI variables. Thus, if we 
find that certain variables cause these amplifications, then we may find ways to affect their behaviour and to thereby 
smooth macroeconomic developments.
Again, I follow Cecchetti (2006) and Gochoco-Bautista (2008), but with a difference. The main difference between my work 
and theirs is that I have chosen different APFI variables. While both authors used stock exchange and housing price indices, 
I have used four other variables: the real effective exchange rate, the nominal effective exchange rate, the nominal 
interest rate and loans. The reason for this choice is that the earlier literature and casual observation of CEE countries 
showed that stock exchanges and housing prices played a smaller role in the macroeconomy during the period under 
review. Nonetheless, the latter has recently started to attract attention in the run-up to and during the 2007−2009 
financial crises in some CEE countries. For example, Borio and Lowe (2002b) found an important difference between 
developed (31 countries) and emerging (13 Asian and Latin American) countries in terms of which financial variables have 
explanatory power in banking crises. They found that in the developed group stock indices and credit developments had 
explanatory roles (in combination) but the exchange rate did not, whereas in the developing group of countries the 
exchange rate and credit developments (in combination) were more likely to lead to financial/banking crisis.15 They also 
mentioned the potentially important role of real estate prices in emerging countries, but had to omit these prices due to 
data limitations.
Thus, in CEE countries, which in many APFI-related respects are closer to developing countries, we might expect that the 
exchange rate plays a more important role than the stock exchange index. The fact that in the CEE countries much fewer 
companies are listed on the stock exchanges than even in similarly developed emerging market countries is another reason 
why we left out stock exchanges from our analysis. We decided to use both the nominal and real effective exchange rates 
because, due to sluggish price and expectation adjustments, the nominal and real exchange rates can show different 
patterns for extended periods. The lack of sufficiently long comparable time series also prevented us from using real 
estate prices, but in the future it would be important to analyse these data as well. Moreover, nominal interest rates may 
also be too low or too high, depending on the conditions prevailing on the international and domestic markets and the 
stance of monetary policy. Finally, the development of loans is an obvious candidate as a useful indicator.
In the rest of this section, I show the estimation results of the effects of the APFI variables listed above on the various 
moments of the GDP gap and Price Level gap, or their cyclical components. Gaps or cyclical components are defined as 
deviations from their own trend, as measured by the Hodrick−Prescott filter. The following four tables show the results of 
estimations for the gap (Table 3), variance of the gap (square of gap) (Table 4) and the expected tail loss (the size of the 
gap when it is large) (Table 5) for GDP and Price Level, as in Cecchetti (2006). For explanatory variables I use the 4, 8 
and 12 percent one-sided deviations of APFI variables from their own trends 4, 8 and 12 quarters in advance. In the case 
15   Borio and Lowe (2002b) use ‘signals’, instead of ‘leads’ or ‘causes’ of crisis. This is probably due to their method: they use the signalling approach 
borrowed from the ‘early warning systems’ literature. Our method is called ‘direct estimation’ method in that literature, but we − following Cecchetti 
(2006) and Gochoco-Bautista (2008) and Borio and Lowe (2004) − use it not only or exclusively to open financial crises, but macroeconomic risks or 
instabilities as well.
3  Asset prices/financial imbalances and 
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of the interest rate a negative deviation, while in the other three cases positive deviations are seen as ‘booms’. In   
Table 6, I report the results of a pool probit regression on the same macroeconomic variables using the same APFI 
variables as before, following Gochoco-Bautista (2008). Interpretation of the results is not easy, because we are looking 
for boom and bust patterns, and the same variable can be significant in both, either one or the other, or neither of the 
phases, with a certain time lag. And, just as in the other cases, we do not have a good theory of lag lengths, so − in line 
with the literature − we somewhat arbitrarily decided to use 4-, 8- and 12-period lags in the context of quarterly data.
In equation (1), I estimate the effect of APFI variables which exceed various thresholds from their own trend several 
periods earlier on the gap (deviation from trend) of the GDP and Price Level. The estimated equation is following:
   (1)
where xi,t denotes the GDP gap or Price Level gap at time t for country i, di,t − k(a) stands for dummy APFI variables in 
excess of a percent at time t − k for country i, while ei,t is the error term. Table 3 reports the estimates of parameter b of 
equation (1).
In Table 3 and the subsequent tables, thresholds are in the lines (left column). Inside the table, the upper values are 
parameters while the numbers below show p-values of their significance. Bold values are significant at 5%, and italic ones 
at 10% confidence levels. The table reads as follows: take the example of the real exchange rate. In Table 3, it is shown 
that the real effective exchange rate significantly increases the negative Price Level gap when it exceeds its own trend by 
4, 8 and 12% thresholds after 8 quarters or lags. The size of the effect is the following: when the real exchange rate 
increases by more than 4 percent above its own trend, the negative GDP gap became even more negative by 1.5 hundredths 
of a percent 8 quarters later. If the exchange rate exceeds its own trend by more than 8 percent, the negative gap will 
exceed 3 hundredths of a percent 8 quarters later. The increase in the nominal effective exchange rate increases the 
positive Price Level gap after 8 lags. This latter result is not intuitive: it may be caused by a common underlying factor 
and/or the chosen period is too short and only the boom period is covered. In most, but not all cases where it is significant 
(4 and 12 quarters later for GDP and 8 and 12 quarters later for the CPI gap), the interest rate (where negative deviation 
from its own trend is seen as a ‘boom’) is associated by increasing negative GDP and Price Level gaps at all thresholds. 
Large positive deviation of loans from its trend results in significantly negative value of the GDP gap at 8 quarters at all 
thresholds. The Price Level gap is positively affected on both the 8- and 12-quarter horizons at all thresholds.
The above results are not very significant in economic terms. That is, although we have some statistically significant 
results, these are quantitatively smaller than in the OECD (Cecchetti, 2006) or Asian (Gochoco-Bautista, 2008) countries. 
In addition, in the latter group of countries, the effects are more consistent, i. e. the signs of the parameters are generally 
the same across time lags, but far from always.
In equation (2), I estimate the effect of the same APFI variables on the variance of the gap of GDP and Price Level:
   (2)
where xi,t denotes the square of the GDP gap or Price Level gap at time t for country i, di,t − k(a) is the dummy for APFI 
variables at time t − k for country i, while υi,t is the error term.
Table 4 reports the estimation results for b’ in equation (2). The only difference from the previous estimation is that the 
dependent variable is the square of the GDP and Price Level gap, rather than the gap itself.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 13
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Table 3
Effects of selected financial variables on gDp and price Level gaps
impact of Asset price Movements on the
 output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
Mean of the price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.00297 −0.00168 −0.00600 4 0.00324 −0.01550 0.00423
0.34110 0.59360 0.06340 0.51900 0.00050 0.29930
8 −0.01190 0.00032 −0.01548 8 −0.02376 −0.03186 0.02083
0.07380 0.96100 0.02070 0.02530 0.00050 0.01360
12 −0.01672 −0.00077 −0.00670 12 0.00181 −0.04995 0.00563




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.00379 −0.00359 0.00318 4 0.00378 0.01447 −0.00213
0.15830 0.17050 0.24330 0.36790 0.00010 0.53670
8 −0.00688 −0.00608 0.01459 8 0.01299 0.03902 −0.00482
0.11940 0.16160 0.00110 0.05720 0.00000 0.39470
12 −0.01871 0.01537 0.02913 12 0.08990 0.04972 −0.03363
0.00840 0.02700 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00020
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.00149 −0.00007 −0.00089 4 0.0008 −0.0033 −0.0010
0.00000 0.84520 0.01620 0.1180 0.0000 0.0066
8 −0.00148 −0.00008 −0.00089 8 0.0008 −0.0033 −0.0010
0.00010 0.82130 0.01620 0.1112 0.0000 0.0066
12 −0.00148 −0.00009 −0.00090 12 0.0008 −0.0033 −0.0010
0.00010 0.79850 0.01470 0.1060 0.0000 0.0063
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.00112 −0.00946 −0.00346 4 0.00200 0.01256 0.00568
0.56310 0.00000 0.10480 0.46960 0.00000 0.00750
8 −0.00486 −0.01224 −0.00062 8 −0.00157 0.01750 0.00856
0.07610 0.00000 0.82810 0.68640 0.00000 0.00250
12 −0.00441 −0.01442 0.00414 12 −0.00916 0.02237 0.00994
0.23180 0.00010 0.27180 0.07730 0.00000 0.00720
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.
The table shows the estimation result of b of the following equation:
 
 
Thresholds are vertically below the financial (apfi) variables and calculated as percentage deviations from HP trends (negative direction in 
the case of interest rate, positive otherwise).
Lags of (HP filtered) dependent macroeconomic variables are indicated horizontally in number of periods of quarterly data.MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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Table 4
Effects of selected financial variables on the variance of the gDp and price Level gap
impact of Asset price Movements on the
 output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
Volatility of price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 4 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
0.48310 0.48310 0.48310 0.94350 0.94350 0.94350
8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
0.68290 0.68290 0.68290 0.88730 0.88730 0.88730
12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 4 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
0.79210 0.79210 0.79210 0.89180 0.89180 0.89180
8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
0.94940 0.94940 0.94940 0.78500 0.78500 0.78500
12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
0.93610 0.93610 0.93610 0.69570 0.69570 0.69570
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 4 −0.00027 −0.00027 −0.00027
0.84660 0.84660 0.84660 0.70420 0.70420 0.70420
8 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 8 −0.00024 −0.00024 −0.00024
0.76850 0.76850 0.76850 0.74030 0.74030 0.74030
12 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 12 −0.00020 −0.00020 −0.00020
0.79620 0.79620 0.79620 0.77650 0.77650 0.77650
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 4 −0.00039 −0.00039 −0.00039
0.00180 0.00180 0.00180 0.13220 0.13220 0.13220
8 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 8 −0.00002 −0.00002 −0.00002
0.69490 0.69490 0.69490 0.81830 0.81830 0.81830
12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 12 −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.00001
0.54780 0.54780 0.54780 0.83380 0.83380 0.83380
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.
The table shows the estimation result of b′ of the following equation:
 
 
Thresholds are vertically below the financial (apfi) variables and calculated as percentage deviations from HP trends (negative direction in 
the case of interest rate, positive otherwise).
Lags of (HP filtered) dependent macroeconomic variables are indicated horizontally in number of periods of quarterly data.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 15
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Here, I find that in general the variance of the gap of the macroeconomic variables is not significantly affected by our 
APFI variables. For the OECD countries, housing price indices proved significant at a 5% level in affecting the variance of 
the GDP gap, but not the Price Level gap. Stock exchange indices did not prove significant in affecting the variance of 
either of the macroeconomic variables in the OECD countries. (For the Asian countries no variance test is available in 
Gochoco-Bautista’s paper).
Next, we look at the estimated tail losses (ETL) of GDP and Price Level. As explained above, our interest here is how bad 
the GDP or CPI gap could be, if they turn out to be really bad.
The estimated equation is: 
   (3)
where xi,t denotes, as before, the GDP gap or Price Level gap at time t for country i, while di,t − k(a) is dummy for APFI 
variables at time t − k for country i. tail(b)i,t is a dummy for the GDP or Price Level gap, taking the value of 1 if in the b 
tail (left hand side − 5, or 25 percentiles for GDP and right hand side − 75 or 95 percentiles − for CPI) of its own distribution. 
Finally, ηi,t is an error term. I report the estimation results for the b3 parameter, which measures the estimated tail loss 
when the GDP or Price Level gap is at its extreme after several quarter lags that the relevant APFI variable exceeded a 
critical threshold. Note that b2 picks up those realisations, where these bad realisations are not preceded (‘explained’) by 
the APFI variables exceeding the critical thresholds. Tables 5a and 5b show the estimation results for expected tail losses 
(ETL) for GDP and CPI: in Table 5a the results are presented for estimations where the tail begins at 25 percentiles (left 
hand) for GDP and 75 percentiles (right hand) for CPI, while in Table 5b the relevant values are 5 and 95 percentiles.
With respect to the 25th and 75th quantiles (Table 5a), the real and nominal effective exchange rates result in significantly 
positive Price Level gaps at several thresholds and lags, but are mostly insignificant with respect to the GDP gap. The 
decrease in the nominal interest rate below the relevant thresholds increases the positive GDP gap (8 and 12 quarters 
later), and suggests a significantly more negative Price Level gap. Loans adversely affect the estimated tail loss for GDP 
at nearly all lags and thresholds, while resulting in a significant increase in the positive Price Level gap. (For the OECD 
countries, Cecchetti finds an economically as well as statistically significant negative effect of both an equity and housing 
boom on both output and (negative) price level gap. For Asian countries, this kind of estimation is not available; instead, 
a pool probit regression has been applied; see below).
As for the 5th and 95th quantiles there are very few realisations in the tails, which means few interpretable results; hence 
the many ones and zeros in the Table 5b. The real and nominal effective exchange rates are significant only in very few 
cases and show no consistent pattern. This is also largely the case with the interest rate. Only loans show some consistency 
and seem to affect the probability of a positive Price Level gap after 4 and 8 lags (see Table 5b).
It is important to note that I looked at positive Price Level gaps, which is in contrast to Cecchetti (2006), but is in line 
with Gochoco-Bautista (2008).MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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Table 5a
Effects of selected financial variables on the estimated tail loss of the gDp and price Level gap
(25th and 75th percentiles)
impact of Asset price Movements on the
Estimated tail loss of output 
Lag of Asset price(k)
Estimated tail loss of price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.00474 0.00025 −0.00869 4 0.05725 0.04337 0.03732
0.41200 0.96820 0.17510 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
8 0.00313 0.01573 −0.02232 8 0.07884 0.03445 0.06432
0.80050 0.25440 0.07150 0.00020 0.06550 0.00010
12 0.01023 0.02979 0.01506 12 0.05371 0.02074 0.04720




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.00658 −0.01068 −0.00875 4 0.08177 0.02681 0.01801
0.20440 0.03540 0.11910 0.00000 0.00010 0.01440
8 −0.00774 −0.02665 −0.01862 8 0.12358 0.02854 0.01871
0.31670 0.00080 0.03150 0.00000 0.00900 0.12820
12 −0.00710 −0.01829 0.01570 12 0.15452 −0.01831 −0.01179
0.56720 0.34730 0.67730 0.00000 0.32470 0.63950
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.00159 0.00382 0.00405 4 −0.01060 −0.00206 −0.00167
0.06420 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.01770 0.00510
8 0.00164 0.00384 0.00414 8 −0.01063 −0.00208 −0.00167
0.05690 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.01650 0.00510
12 0.00166 0.00386 0.00416 12 −0.01067 −0.00210 −0.00167
0.05360 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.01550 0.00510
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.01291 −0.01492 −0.01208 4 0.01987 0.01440 −0.00497
0.00120 0.00050 0.01030 0.00020 0.01110 0.21630
8 −0.01249 −0.01361 −0.01952 8 0.04012 0.02550 −0.00006
0.01360 0.01130 0.00130 0.00000 0.00030 0.99030
12 −0.00694 −0.00983 −0.01945 12 0.06243 0.02489 −0.00474
0.30090 0.15780 0.01280 0.00000 0.00480 0.47260
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.




Thresholds are vertically below the financial (apfi) variables and calculated as percentage deviations from HP trends (negative direction in 
the case of interest rate, positive otherwise).
Lags of (HP filtered) dependent macroeconomic variables are indicated horizontally in number of periods of quarterly data.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 17
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Table 5b
Effects of selected financial variables on the estimated tail loss of the gDp and price Level gap 
(5th and 95th percentiles)
impact of Asset price Movements on the
Estimated tail loss of output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
Estimated tail loss price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.07463 0.04688 0.03175 4 0.09091 0.01587 0.00000
0.00570 0.07730 0.23540 0.00110 0.55290 1.00000
8 0.07143 0.07143 0.14286 8 0.14286 0.00000 0.00000
0.22810 0.20830 0.01160 0.01860 1.00000 1.00000
12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.05882 0.08140 0.01205 4 0.11364 0.05952 0.06098
0.01470 0.00030 0.60710 0.00000 0.00750 0.00020
8 0.06061 0.09091 0.00000 8 0.22857 0.06250 0.03125
0.11770 0.01240 1.00000 0.00000 0.08350 0.23040
12 0.08333 0.00000 0.00000 12 0.58333 0.00000 0.00000
0.19470 1.00000 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.01770 0.04546 0.06376 4 0.04985 0.03165 0.01424
0.14280 0.00010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00900 0.17600
8 0.02029 0.04478 0.06601 8 0.04913 0.03115 0.01404
0.09010 0.00010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00950 0.17910
12 0.01983 0.04361 0.06431 12 0.04789 0.03333 0.02055
0.09380 0.00010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00490 0.04630
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.07018 0.07792 0.04930 4 0.06024 0.06757 0.02174
0.00000 0.00000 0.00540 0.00030 0.00010 0.14760
8 0.08434 0.07407 0.05128 8 0.08537 0.10127 0.01316
0.00050 0.00160 0.03220 0.00030 0.00000 0.51570
12 0.04546 0.04546 0.04651 12 0.13636 0.09091 0.00000
0.17420 0.15460 0.14970 0.00000 0.00510 1.00000
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.





Thresholds are vertically below the financial (apfi) variables and calculated as percentage deviations from HP trends (negative direction in 
the case of interest rate, positive otherwise).
Lags of (HP filtered) dependent macroeconomic variables are indicated horizontally in number of periods of quarterly data.MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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Next, we turn to a simple panel probit regression (4) and ask the following question: to what degree is the probability of 
a negative GDP gap tail risk and a positive Price Level gap tail risk affected in the margin by occurrences of APFI booms? 
The following equation has been estimated:
   (4)
where yi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the GDP gap or Price Level gap is in the tail of its own distribution, 
otherwise the dummy equals 0. xi,t−k denotes the APFI variables at time t − k for country i. Pr(xit = 1 dit−k ) is the conditional 
probability of xit, i. e., what is the probability of the GDP at time t for country i being in the tail, given that the APFI 
variable exceeds the relevant threshold.
The leads and thresholds for filtering the APFI variables are the same as before. We use both the 25th and 75th percentiles 
(Table 6a) and the 5th and 95th (Table 6b) for the GDP gap and Price Level gaps. Here, the macroeconomic variables are 
y and on the left hand side one finds the standard CDFs of x, the APFI variable.
In case of 25th and 75th quantiles, there are few significant results for nominal and real exchange rates. Interest rate 
undershooting results in a higher probability of a negative GDP and Price Level gap at 4 and 8 quarters lag. Loans positively 
affect the probability of a Price Level gap in the case of quite a few lags and thresholds, while negatively affecting the 
GDP gap at a 4-quarter lag, but positively at a 12-quarter lag at 8 and 12 percent thresholds.
For the 5th and 95th percentiles, the results are summarised in Table 6b. real exchange rate and nominal exchange rates 
do not seem to be significant except the real exchange rate effect on the likelihood of a negative Price Level gap at all 
thresholds after 8-quarter lags. Interest rate undershooting seems to increase the probability of a negative Price Level gap 
at several thresholds and lags. Loans positively affect the probability of a Price Level gap at all thresholds after 8 and 12 
lags.
Parameters of probit regressions are not to be interpreted as marginal effects on the dependent variable. To better 
illustrate the degree to which the probability of the occurrence of the tail event changes in response to the APFI variable 
exceeding certain thresholds, we compiled Table 7a for the 25th and Table 7b for 5th percentiles.16
The numbers in brackets are probabilities of the tail events of the GDP or the Price Level gap when the APFI variable is 
not in its 5th/95th or 25th/75th percentile tail respectively: that is, the bracketed term is the constant of the probit 
regression recalculated as probability. The bracketed numbers are the estimated probabilities of the APFI variables when 
not in the tail of their distribution (constant time normal distribution), while the number without brackets are the 
probabilities of the same variables when in their own tails (constant plus beta times normal distribution). The signs and 
significance levels are taken from the probit estimations, as reported in Tables 6a and 6b. When the probability is 
significant, the bracketed number should be smaller than the non-bracketed one.
Using 25th and 75th percentiles, only loans resulted in significant and meaningful estimates: loans marginally increase the 
positive Price Level gap at all thresholds. Significant inverse effects of interest rates are visible for both the GDP and Price 
Level gap (see Table 7a).
At the 5% level (Table 7b), again only the effect of loans seems to be meaningful, where it is positive and significant at 
nearly all thresholds and after all lags. To a lesser extent, and somewhat inconsistently, the interest rate variable affects 
inversely the Price Level gap.
16 Bartus (2005) discusses methods to translate probit regression parameters to marginal effects.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 19
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Table 6a
probit estimation: ApFi-s impact on the probability of macroeconomic risks
(25th and 75th percentiles)
panel probit: impact of Asset price Movements on the
25th quantile of output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
75th quantile of price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.29535 −0.74516 −0.34857 4 0.07037 −0.46896 0.33177
0.12260 0.00090 0.08160 0.67160 0.01710 0.05760
8 −0.43523 −4.18927 −1.24406 8 0.63267 −1.29578 0.18493
0.31870 0.00970 0.11580 0.06530 0.03400 0.65880
12 0.13772 −4.63571 −1.04924 12 0.82535 −5.40196 0.55121




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.49092 −0.51215 −0.55803 4 −0.08111 −0.26504 0.21603
0.00990 0.00790 0.00890 0.60180 0.11150 0.19370
8 −0.25636 −0.64002 −0.81395 8 0.14062 −0.08130 0.42838
0.37430 0.06680 0.07920 0.55570 0.75300 0.13640
12 −2.63562 −0.35773 −1.15375 12 −0.39473 −0.58770 1.12159
0.06040 0.52640 0.39090 0.38090 0.24280 0.11090
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.07183 −0.06886 −0.00741 4 −0.15011 −0.06868 0.03236
0.00110 0.02060 0.84900 0.00000 0.00050 0.31930
8 −0.07238 −0.06963 −0.01013 8 −0.14933 −0.06842 0.03254
0.00110 0.01970 0.79530 0.00000 0.00050 0.31840
12 −0.07138 −0.07187 −0.00870 12 −0.15108 −0.06938 0.03438
0.00130 0.01640 0.82440 0.00000 0.00040 0.29420
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.57129 −0.10678 0.15086 4 0.13552 0.18816 0.35686
0.00000 0.40120 0.24140 0.24410 0.11660 0.00390
8 −0.71619 −0.10192 0.38856 8 0.25784 0.45274 0.55635
0.00050 0.57190 0.02830 0.08810 0.00450 0.00130
12 −0.78900 0.02996 0.50105 12 0.44418 0.67203 1.07073
0.00360 0.89710 0.03600 0.01990 0.00080 0.00000
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.
The table shows the estimation results of coefficient of:
 
    
 
Thresholds are vertically below the financial (apfi) variables and calculated as percentage deviations from HP trends (negative direction in 
the case of interest rate, positive otherwise). 
Lags of (HP filtered) dependent macroeconomic variables are indicated horizontally in number of periods of quarterly data.MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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Table 6b
probit estimation: ApFi-s impact on the probability of macroeconomic risks
(5th and 95th percentiles)
panel probit: impact of Asset price Movements on the
5th quantile of output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
95th quantile of price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.3176 −0.3449 −0.2523 4 −0.5330 −6.0401 0.2484
0.4349 0.3997 0.5187 0.1591 0.0103 0.3205
8 −1.7010 −2.3304 −0.3545 8 0.1942 −7.0211 −0.5514
0.4893 0.3942 0.7437 0.7084 0.0013 0.5812
12 −1.9223 −2.5595 −0.0572 12 −0.7649 −7.1238 −0.3126




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 0.1441 −0.2779 −0.3078 4 −0.1716 −0.0334 0.3699
0.6037 0.4498 0.4440 0.5136 0.8914 0.1000
8 0.0471 0.1347 −1.0226 8 0.0563 0.2464 0.2652
0.9211 0.7783 0.5053 0.8790 0.4695 0.5072
12 −1.8076 0.8711 −0.9528 12 −2.4223 0.0088 −1.1904
0.4602 0.1823 0.7074 0.2185 0.9890 0.4959
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.0635 −0.0629 −0.0524 4 −0.1198 −0.0614 0.1332
0.0321 0.1784 0.3988 0.0000 0.0120 0.0514
8 −0.0632 −0.0621 −0.0507 8 −0.1197 −0.0611 0.1380
0.0331 0.1857 0.4172 0.0000 0.0125 0.0461
12 −0.0630 −0.0614 −0.0493 12 −0.1196 −0.0620 0.1428
0.0341 0.1928 0.4327 0.0000 0.0112 0.0414
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 −0.2481 −0.7254 0.1575 4 0.2837 0.3907 0.5930
0.3210 0.0417 0.4779 0.1008 0.0273 0.0010
8 −0.0759 −1.8684 −0.2055 8 0.3798 0.6550 0.9069
0.8115 0.1277 0.5863 0.0723 0.0019 0.0000
12 −0.1411 −2.1448 0.0776 12 0.4046 0.9497 0.9616
0.7447 0.0840 0.8569 0.1246 0.0001 0.0005
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.
The table shows the estimation results of coefficient of:
 
    
 
Thresholds are vertically below the financial (apfi) variables and calculated as percentage deviations from HP trends (negative direction in 
the case of interest rate, positive otherwise). 
Lags of (HP filtered) dependent macroeconomic variables are indicated horizontally in number of periods of quarterly data.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 21
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Table 7a
probabilities
(25th and 75th percentiles)
panel probit: Marginal impact of Asset price Movements on the
25th quantile of output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
75th quantile of price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.2440) 0.1614 (0.2748) 0.0895 (0.2809) 0.1765 4 (0.2369) 0.2592 (0.2700) 0.1397 (0.2651) 0.3837
neg neg neg poz
8 (0.2373) 0.1250 (0.2550) 0.0000 (0.2729) 0.0323 8 (0.2350) 0.4642 (0.2599) 0.0262 (0.2766) 0.3416
neg poz neg





Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.2503) 0.1221 (0.2712) 0.1310 (0.2857) 0.1305 4 (0.2426) 0.2180 (0.2663) 0.1870 (0.2689) 0.3446
neg neg neg
8 (0.2381) 0.1664 (0.2601) 0.0998 (0.2738) 0.0785 8 (0.2374) 0.2830 (0.2573) 0.2317 (0.2727) 0.4300
neg neg neg




Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.2244) 0.2035 (0.2436) 0.2225 (0.2712) 0.2688 4 (0.2034) 0.1636 (0.2432) 0.2222 (0.2881) 0.2992
neg neg neg neg
8 (0.2241) 0.2030 (0.2432) 0.2219 (0.2709) 0.2676 8 (0.2032) 0.1636 (0.2430) 0.2221 (0.2883) 0.2995
neg neg neg neg
12 (0.2241) 0.2033 (0.2425) 0.2206 (0.2710) 0.2682 12 (0.2023) 0.1624 (0.2425) 0.2213 (0.2886) 0.3005
neg neg neg neg
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.2766) 0.1222 (0.2669) 0.2330 (0.2606) 0.3118 4 (0.2300) 0.2732 (0.2440) 0.3066 (0.2504) 0.3759
neg poz
8 (0.2556) 0.0848 (0.2615) 0.2295 (0.2597) 0.3991 8 (0.2313) 0.3168 (0.2428) 0.4034 (0.2622) 0.4681
neg poz poz poz poz
12 (0.2472) 0.0705 (0.2580) 0.2678 (0.2648) 0.4492 12 (0.2318) 0.3864 (0.2451) 0.4929 (0.2629) 0.6687
neg poz poz poz poz
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.
Signs and significance levels are taken from the probit regressions.
The bracketed numbers are marginal effects of the APFI variables when not in the tail of their distribution (constant time normal 
distribution), while the other numbers are the marginal effects of the same variables when in their own tails (constant plus beta times 
normal distribution). The signs and significance levels are taken from the probit estimations.MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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Table 7b
probabilities
(5th and 95th percentiles)
panel probit: Marginal impact of Asset price Movements on the
5th quantile of output gap
Lag of Asset price(k)
95th quantile of price Level
Lag of Asset price(k)
real effective 
exchange rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.0309) 0.0144 (0.0336) 0.0148 (0.0362) 0.0202 4 (0.0511) 0.0151 (0.0483) 0.0000 (0.0517) 0.0838
neg
8 (0.0292) 0.0002 (0.0315) 0.0000 (0.0347) 0.0150 8 (0.0468) 0.0691 (0.0447) 0.0000 (0.0556) 0.0160
neg





Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.0279) 0.0385 (0.0335) 0.0174 (0.0364) 0.0178 4 (0.0492) 0.0340 (0.0513) 0.0479 (0.0492) 0.0998
poz
8 (0.0291) 0.0323 (0.0312) 0.0419 (0.0349) 0.0023 8 (0.0470) 0.0528 (0.0495) 0.0803 (0.0540) 0.0898
12 (0.0289) 0.0001 (0.0305) 0.1580 (0.0342) 0.0028 12 (0.0463) 0.0000 (0.0509) 0.0518 (0.0549) 0.0026
Nominal 
interest rate
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.0256) 0.0220 (0.0294) 0.0254 (0.0338) 0.0301 4 (0.0321) 0.0243 (0.0449) 0.0394 (0.0579) 0.0751
neg neg neg poz
8 (0.0256) 0.0220 (0.0294) 0.0255 (0.0339) 0.0302 8 (0.0320) 0.0243 (0.0449) 0.0394 (0.0581) 0.0759
neg neg neg poz
12 (0.0256) 0.0220 (0.0294) 0.0255 (0.0339) 0.0303 12 (0.0320) 0.0243 (0.0447) 0.0391 (0.0582) 0.0768
neg neg neg poz
Loans
Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12 Threshold (alfa) 4 8 12
4 (0.0332) 0.0186 (0.0393) 0.0065 (0.0316) 0.0446 4 (0.0398) 0.0709 (0.0395) 0.0861 (0.0359) 0.1136
neg poz poz
8 (0.0301) 0.0253 (0.0320) 0.0001 (0.0363) 0.0227 8 (0.0423) 0.0894 (0.0407) 0.1383 (0.0398) 0.1986
poz poz poz
12 (0.0300) 0.0216 (0.0302) 0.0000 (0.0347) 0.0411 12 (0.0445) 0.0975 (0.0404) 0.2128 (0.0463) 0.2357
neg poz poz
Note: Bold means significant at 5%, italic 10% level.
Signs and significance levels are taken from the probit regressions.
The bracketed numbers are marginal effects of the APFI variables when not in the tail of their distribution (constant time normal 
distribution), while the other numbers are the marginal effects of the same variables when in their own tails (constant plus beta times 
normal distribution). The signs and significance levels are taken from the probit estimations.MNB workiNg papers • 2011/8 23
In this study, we looked at some indicators of financial imbalances and investigated whether these played a role in 
macroeconomic risks. We have adapted Cecchetti’s (2006) and Gochoco-Bautista’s (2008) work to Central and Eastern 
European Countries. In the first part of the study, we looked at the behaviour of critical macroeconomic indicators, the 
GDP and Price Level gaps, to see if they could be safely represented by a normal distribution. We found that instead these 
could be better approximated by some fat-tailed distributions such as Student-t. This means that occurrences of 
significantly worse GDP and CPI gaps are more frequent, or extreme outcomes are worse than what is suggested by the 
normal distribution. That is, central banks concentrating only on the mean and variance of the critical macroeconomic 
variables are risking larger macroeconomic gaps than they are aware of. With the same preferences and knowing this, they 
would probably react differently to the otherwise unchanged information base. It is important to remember, however, that 
our ability to statistically detect leptokurtic (fat tailed) series is very limited, not to mention how to handle them. By 
definition, rare events with large impacts are rare, and develop in somewhat unexpected ways.
In the second part, we tried to find empirical links between developments in the selected APFI variables and various 
macroeconomic risk indicators. We found mixed results. Some of the statistically significant results are not significant in 
economic terms. Others could not be interpreted easily or contradict our expectations. The best results were seen across 
various estimations for loans, but even in that case the results were not consistent. This mixed result can be explained by 
various ways. We may need better indicators or more significant variables leading to macroeconomic risks. For example, 
we concentrated on domestic indicators, while the countries under investigation are highly integrated and subject to 
developments in foreign markets in terms of liquidity and risk appetite. Use of variables adequately capturing these 
exogenous effects could also improve our results.17 Moreover, instead of looking at explanatory variables individually, 
combinations of variables could improve our results.
17   Alessi and Detken (2009) found global liquidity as one of the most significant early warning indicators of financial distresses, including the present 
crisis. 
4  Summary and conclusions for 
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CALCuLATioN oF gDp-AT-riSk AND Cpi-AT-riSk
In the paper, we compare two GDP-at-risk and CPI-at-risk values to show the difference between the one calculated by 
using a normal distribution and the other by using a fat-tailed distribution. We have chosen 5 percent Var level in both 
cases in accordance with usual practice. Moreover, it has been shown that the distribution of financial market data can 
be satisfactorily approximated by the Student-t distribution. We use the (reciprocal) of the Hill-index value to determine 
the degree of freedom of the Student-t distribution. Of course, one could use other parameters as well for the cut-off 
value or the level of Var or other distributions than Student-t to approximate fat-tailed distribution.
For calculating the fat-tailed GDP-at-risk and CPI-at-risk figures, we use an adaptation of the Extreme Value Theory, which 
is extensively applied in financial markets. It involves the calculation of a tail index. The most common among such indices 
is the so-called Hill index. The Hill index seeks to model the extreme values of a particular distribution. As such, it does 
not model the whole distribution, only the ‘tails’. The calculation is based on the following equation:
 
Where X is the variable whose Hill index we are interested in. Xi denotes value which separates the ‘tail’ from the rest of 
the distribution, representing the smallest or largest 10% of the distribution. The value of m is the number of observations 
in the tail. Xn−m,n stands for the values in the tail. Finally, n is the total number of observations.
A crucial choice in applying the formula is to determine where the tail begins. In large samples it is estimated, while in 
small samples the usual practice is to apply a rule of thumb. Here, we arbitrarily took the smallest or largest 10 percent 
of all values as extreme values.18 In other words, first one has to determine 10% of the smallest (or largest) values. One 
has to calculate the log differences between each extreme value beyond the cut-off value (which separates the tail from 
the rest or the distribution) and the cut-off value itself. The sum of these differences is divided by the order of the tail 
(i. e. the number of extreme values), which gives the average log difference between the tail realisation and the cut-off 
value. The resulting figure is the tail index, or Hill index, the reciprocal of which is the number of the moments of the 
tail (in the literature sometimes this reciprocal value is called the tail or Hill index).
The only remaining step is to multiply the one-sided 5% level Student-t value by the standard deviation of the cyclical 
components of the CPI and GDP. The normal distribution based GDP-at-risk and CPI-at-risk figures are usually calculated 
simply by multiplying the standard deviation of the cyclical components of the relevant series by − 1,645, which is the 
normal distribution at one-sided 5% level.
Due to short time period, the Hill index calculation is based on 4-6 observations, depending on the length of the series 
of the particular country. The Jarque−Bera normality test of the whole sample of approximately 600 data points have weak 
power if calculated country by country (less than 60 data points by country). Thus, a pool analysis is necessary to assess 
the appropriateness of the normality assumption of the distribution of the GDP and CPI data.
18   There are other rules, see for example LeBaron et al. (2004). We follow Cecchetti for the ease of application and to ensure comparability with his 
results.




We used the database collected by Benczúr et al. (2005); in most cases the range spans from 1991 Q1−2005 Q1. Benczúr 
et al. generously provided us with the extended set of series, which spans until the end of 2008 or 2009 Q1 prepared for 
updating their study. We wish to thank them for making available this unique, most useful data set which stands out for 
its coverage and comprehensiveness in terms of time span, number of macroeconomic variables and CEE countries.
Filtering data:
In this study we used the Hodrick−Prescott method to decompose the trend and cycle components of the time series. One 
reason for that was that it is the easiest to use for a relatively short time series. The alternative, Baxter−King method is 
suitable for longer series. Another reason is that most authors use the H-P filter and so it is more useful for international 
comparison.
However, one must bear in mind that the results based on this particular method may not be robust to the alternatives. 
It has been shown in the context of the Central and Eastern European countries (Darvas and Vadas, 2005), that choice of 
a particular method for filtering trend and cycle components has a significant effect on the results − including Hodrick-
Prescott as well. They found that not a single method could be recommended as the single best one. Instead, they 
proposed a combined methodology.
Seasonal adjustment:
For developed countries, data are readily available in seasonally adjusted versions as well. For CEE countries this is usually 
not the case. Benczúr et al. (2005) used x11 method for analysing business cycle properties of CEE countries. Darvas and 
Szapary also used x11 method for CEE economies before filtering for trend and business cycles and analysing cyclical 
co-movements of the EMU and selected CEE economies. Darvas et al. (2005) used SEATS/TrAMO for comparing the 
performance of various filtering methods for CEE countries. We also decided to apply SEATS/TrAMO as it was available 
freely in the Demetra program package.
Among its strengths − beside it user friendly interface − one finds its capability to manipulate a large number of time series 
together, in a more or less automated fashion. However, despite of the intention of the creators and supporters of the 
program package, no commonly available dataset was available at the time of writing for the various holiday and other 
workday adjustments applicable to different countries. Thus, we had to mark those days ourselves using internet resources 
for national holidays. Although we tried to do our best, such a treatment is far from being flawless and involves a high risk 
of making mistakes in preparing the raw data. Nonetheless, we found it more appropriate to use the best technique 
available even if it is not flawless, rather than to rely on an outmoded one, however convenient it may have been.
In addition to deciding on the group members of a relatively homogeneous pool of countries, we also had to decide on 
the time periods. One choice could be to use idiosyncratic periods for each country which could be seen as ‘normal’ ones, 
i.e. the following ‘non-normal’ period of systemic transformation. As not all countries went though the systemic 
transformation at the same time, that choice would result in heterogeneous chronological periods. The drawback of this 
choice would be that the effects and shocks from the external environment could be different, and thus, we would 
mistakenly attribute these to varying internal factors. Given the fact that these countries are very open, this could be as 
serious a problem as those arising from using one-fits-all time period for countries with different periods of ‘normalcy’. 
Alternatively, had we used only the common chronological part of the idiosyncratic periods, it would have resulted in too 
much sacrifice in the number of total data points. Thus, we tried to arrive at a compromise by choosing a period when 
overly wild variations in the CPI and GDP series had disappeared, after the effects of the systemic transformation. Our 
decision resulted in a somewhat arbitrary choice of periods, informed mainly by the series themselves, rather than by 
deep knowledge of the particulars of each country’s recent economic history.MAGYAr NEMZETI BANK
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The above considerations resulted the following periods for the earlier dataset:
  gDp figures  Cpi figures
  BUL: Q1:1998 - Q1:2009   Q1:1998 - Q3:2008
  CrO: Q1:1998 - Q4:2008   Q1:1998 - Q3:2008
  CZr: Q1:1994 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  EST: Q1:1993- Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  HUN: Q1:1995 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  LAT: Q1:1993 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  LIT: Q1:1993- Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  POL: Q1:1994 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  rOM: Q1:1994 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  SLK: Q1:1993 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
  SLV: Q1: 1993 - Q1:2009   Q1:1993 - Q3:2008
russia: was not considered as homogenous with the above group of countries due to its size and economic structure (as 
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Chart A2
QQ-plots relative to normal distribution for cyclical components of Cpi and gDp 
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APPENDIx
Chart 3





























































* The Jarque−Bera test significant at 10%.
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